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HOME OWNER ASSOCIATION ASSESSMENT
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK-AN OVERVIEW
PATRICK J. ROHAN*
JOHN P. HEALY**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Home Owner Association arrangement (hereinafter HOA)
has been a familiar part of the American residential property
scene since the turn of the century. The HOA format, however,
was not widely used until after World War II, when the advent of
F.H.A. documentation and related texts brought new life to the
concept. Thereafter, when new housing developments began to
feature golf courses, swimming pools, tennis courts, and other rec-
reational facilities, the HOA became the vehicle of choice to own
and operate these amenities. In the early nineteen sixties, the ad-
vent of condominium legislation in all fifty states, as well as the
appearance of the "time-sharing" arrangement, further spurred
interest in residential properties that were operated, to a greater
or lesser degree, by an HOA type vehicle. HOAs have also been
employed to hold title to large scale amenities (such as golf
courses), that are designed to be utilized and paid for by constitu-
ent owners of two or more independent condominium develop-
ments. Another impetus to the use of the HOA originated with lo-
" Copyright 1999, Patrick J. Rohan and John P. Healy. B.A., LL.B. St. John's
University;, LL.M. Harvard Law School, J.S.D. Columbia University; Professor of
Law, St. John's University. In the interest of full disclosure the reader is advised
that Professor Rohan served of counsel to the attorneys for the developer in the
Roxrun case, and of counsel to the attorneys for the plaintiff-stockholders in the
Sherry Netherlands Hotel case, both of which are referred to in this article.
"" B.A. Amherst College; J.D. St. John's University; currently an associate in
the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman & Handler, L.L.P.
' For a detailed treatment of the origin and development of home owner associa-
tions in the United States, see 6A PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
HOmE OWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS-LAW AND PRACTICE
(1998). This treatise also contains an analysis of applicable federal and state laws; il-
lustrative documentation; and a comprehensive bibliography on the subject.
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cal governments who refused to accept dedication of the roads in
new housing developments in order to reduce municipal expenses.
This, in turn, necessitated a private vehicle to take over such
mundane tasks as pothole repair, snow removal, and the regula-
tion of parking and speeding. Most recently, builders have become
dissatisfied with the rigidity of many condominium statutes,
which, in turn, necessitated overly-rigid condominium project
documentation. Builders have also taken exception to the sizable
legal, engineering and related costs associated with the prepara-
tion of such documentation. Consequently, there has been a
growing trend toward building HOAs, as opposed to condominium-
type projects. At this juncture, it makes sense to examine the
large body of litigation surrounding HOA projects and their docu-
mentation to avoid making some of these same mistakes in the fu-
ture. In the pages that follow, the authors examine the case law
pertaining to the levying and collection of maintenance charges in
HOA projects located in New York State.2 In the process, the
writers examine a number of defenses that have been interposed
by individual home buyers when resisting HOA assessment col-
lection efforts and make several recommendations for changes in
HOA documents and applicable statutes to strengthen the hand of
the HOA (and reduce the need to resort to the courts) in these
matters.
II. NEPONSIT AND ITS PROGENY
In the now famous Neponsite case, the New York Court of Ap-
peals provided the common-law basis for HOAs to levy assess-
2 See, e.g., Douglas Manor Ass'n v. Alimaris, 626 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1995);
Douglas Manor Ass'n v. Popovich, 562 N.Y.S.2d 170 (App. Div. 1990); Riverton Com-
munity Ass'n v. Myers, 530 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1988); Seaview Ass'n v. Williams,
505 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (App. Div. 1986), affd, 510 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1987); Mohegan Colony
Ass'n v. Picone, 402 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 1978); Shrub Oak Park Community Ass'n v.
Fiducia, 410 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1978); Tides Property Owners' Ass'n v. Paolillo,
392 N.Y.S.2d 670 (App. Div. 1977); Lincolnshire Civic Ass'n v. Beach, 364 N.Y.S.2d 248
(App. Div. 1975); Fieldston Property Owners Ass'n v. Decorative Trends, Inc., 373
N.Y.S.2d 806 (App. Term. 1975) (per curiam), affd, 391 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1977)
(mem.); Tomkins Lakes Estates Ass'n v. Speisman, 273 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Sea Gate Ass'n v. Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Starkey Point Property
Owners' Ass'n v. Wilson, 409 N.Y.S.2d 376 (County Ct. 1978); Patchogue Properties,
Inc. v. Cirillo, 283 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Dist. Ct. 1967), aff/d, 302 N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Term.
1969).
3 Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indust. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1938).
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ments for maintenance purposes. In so doing, the court brushed
aside centuries-old prohibitions against affirmative covenants
(especially covenants to pay money), and concluded that such
covenants could run with the land, did "touch and concern the
land," and could be enforced by an HOA as the alter ego of the
constituent property owners (even though technically the associa-
tion did not own any land in the project).
Subsequent cases in the New York trial courts, appellate di-
visions, and Court of Appeals have concluded that persons who
knowingly buy into a community serviced by an HOA must pay
their pro rata share of annual assessments levied by the associa-
tion.4 The holdings requiring recalcitrant purchasers to pay their
fair share for services and facilities provided by the HOA have
been grounded on a theory of implied contract between such own-
ers and the association. Several courts have granted summary
judgment to the HOA, 5 except in the rare instance where there is a
triable issue of fact as to whether the property owner knew (or
should have known) that the association furnished facilities or
services at the time the recalcitrant owner acquired title.6 As a
practical matter, the latter defense is all but impossible to main-
tain because notice is often provided by such things as a view of
the area, posted signs, title reports received prior to closing, or
adjustments made with the seller at closing (for the unused por-
4 See Williams, 510 N.E.2d at 797 (noting that the proportionate payment of as-
sessments results from an implied in fact contract that exists where there is knowl-
edge that a homeowners' association provides facilities and services for its residents);
Fieldston Property Owners Assn, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (holding that the proportionate
share of costs for services is due, regardless of whether the residents exercised the
right to join the association); Alimaris, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (finding that breach of
implied contract and unjust enrichment allowed the payments of assessment charges);
Popovich, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 170 (holding assessment costs due because of breach of im-
plied contract and unjust enrichment); Speisman, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (noting that
having actual notice of the community's character and purchasing property implies an
acceptance to pay one's pro rata share of costs of maintenance and services); Fleischer,
211 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (noting that the share of costs is dependent upon the measure-
ment of facilities and services offered and not those actually used); Harbor Hills Land-
owners v. Manelski, 318 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796-97 (Dist. Ct. 1970) (relying on Fleischer to
hold resident liable for proportionate share of costs for maintenance and services);
Cirillo, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (finding that purchase of property with knowledge of the
private nature of the community results in implied consent to pay for services and
maintenance).
6 See, e.g., Alimaris, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54; Popovich, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 171;
Speisman, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
6 See, e.g., Paolillo, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (remanding case to develop facts as to
whether an implied contract could be found as to each particular defendant).
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tion of the pre-paid annual assessment).' In addressing other de-
fenses of delinquent property owners, the courts have ruled that,
while dissatisfaction with maintenance of the common property by
the HOA may be the basis for a suit against the officers of the as-
sociation, it cannot be the basis for non-payment of one's annual
assessment.' Similar results have been reached where property
owners sought to avoid paying assessments either by refusing to
join the association or by attempting to surrender their right to
use common facilities and services.9
7 See, e.g., Alimaris, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (finding delinquent property owners
made adjustments at closing or paid money to the HOA in compliance with covenants
and restrictions, and that property owners' deeds expressly referenced a deed tax pay-
able to the HOA); Popovich, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 171 (finding sufficient notice from signs of
a private development and from the content of the deed received by purchaser); Man-
elski, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 796 ("There is no question in the Court's mind that the defen-
dant had adequate notice of the deed covenants and restrictions as set forth, and fur-
ther, the defendant assumed the obligations imposed by these deeds by signing and
executing the deed which was delivered to him."); Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 779
("When these defendants bought their property they knew of all of the existing condi-
tions imposed upon ownership in the area. All others were open and visible to them
and should have been known to them.").
" See, e.g., Cirillo, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (rejecting defendant's claim that acts of
board of directors were ultra vires); Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (finding that the
plaintiffs were not able to attack the actions of the board as being ultra vires because
plaintiffs were neither members nor in a contractual relationship with the board).
9 See Williams, 510 N.E.2d at 794 (requiring residents to pay their proportion-
ate share regardless of the fact that they did not join the association or use the fa-
cilities); Fieldston Property Owners Ass'n, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (holding residents
were required to pay even though they did not join the association); Speisman, 273
N.Y.S.2d at 460 (membership in the corporation is not that which gives the right to
property owners to enjoy easements and services provided by the association. It is
the ownership of property which effects that result).
In Fleischer, the court stated:
To direct an abatement of the assessments merely because the defendants
chose not to pay the assessments, would be a means of destroying a private
community such as is involved here. If every property owner could abate
his assessment by refusing to pay the assessment, then this private com-
munity could not continue to exist.
Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 783. The rule that residents cannot avoid responsibility
for their fair share of assessments by opting not to use them or foregoing member-
ship privileges finds a parallel in the Condominium Act provision that prohibits unit
owners from attempting to exempt themselves from assessments by agreeing not to
use common facilities. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-x (McKinney 1989). Fur-
thermore, a provision has been upheld that requires owners in a subdivision to be-
come and remain members of an association for maintenance of recreational facili-
ties. See Lincolnshire Civic Ass'n v. Beach, 364 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (App. Div. 1975)
(upholding the covenant as similar to an affirmative covenant to pay money).
The courts have also resolved the related question whether an HOA (operating
under antiquated documents that went into effect in the early part of the century) is
[73:199
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A representative case is Seaview Association v. Williams,0
wherein the HOA sued a delinquent property owner for unpaid
annual assessments. A five-day trial led to a judgment in favor of
the HOA (which was subsequently affirmed by a 4-1 vote in the
Appellate Division, First Department, and by a unanimous Court
of Appeals). The courts found that the following factors were not
controlling: (a) the covenants did not originate with the original
developer of the homes; (b) the defendants never joined the asso-
ciation; (c) the documents and posted signs stated that non-
association members (as well as their tenants) could not use the
facilities of the association; (d) the defendants never paid any por-
tion of the assessments; and (e) seventy-seven percent of the funds
barred from collecting assessments that exceed dollar or rate increase caps found in
the original covenants and restrictions. Predictably, the dollar limits and caps at
issue in these cases reflected the relative cost of maintenance for the times when
they were drafted. These costs happened to be well below what the HOA was assess-
ing property owners decades later. Although the judicial opinions are terse, a close
reading of them, coupled with a perusal of the trial transcripts, reveals that the
courts have routinely upheld the full amount of the assessments. Thus, for example,
the court held a property owner liable for the full amount of the assessment in
Popovich, even though the original documents limited levies to a tax of one dollar
per lot, per year, and the HOA levy in question went far beyond that dollar limita-
tion. See Popovich, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 171. In Fieldston Property Owners' Ass'n, the
court rejected a similar defense and awarded the HOA the full amount of the as-
sessment. See Fieldston Property Owners'Ass'n, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
The implied contract theory judicially adopted in New York carries with it the
court's innate ability to do complete justice, including the awarding of pre-judgment
interest from the time the association's assessment levy was originally due and pay-
able. See, e.g., Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (ordering defendants to pay the as-
sessments they owed with interest computed from the date upon which the assess-
ments were originally due); Board of Managers v. Shandel, 542 N.Y.S.2d 466, 468-69
(Civ. Ct. 1989) (awarding interest at highest legal rate permitted); Cirillo, 283
N.Y.S.2d at 564 (ordering recovery of overdue assessments "together with interest
accruing as of the date each annual assessment became due and owing"); see also
Manelski, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (upholding corporation's by-laws that authorized in-
terest and penalties on unpaid assessments). But see Riverton Community Ass'n v.
Myers, 584 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (App. Div. 1992) (awarding "interest from the date of
the commencement of trial").
Further, Judge Cardozo as well as the Weinstein, Korn & Miller treatise have
taken the position that, in quasi and implied contract cases, the courts have
authority to award full back interest. They also argue that such awards may be
made in the interest of justice and are not limited to the rate prescribed for post-
judgment interest. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK ClVIL PRACTICE §
5001:1-5001:6 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1981)
(noting that an anticipatory breach gives rise to a claim for damages for total
breach); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 110 (1937) (adopting the same view); 22
N.Y. JUR. 2d Contracts §§ 445-447, 457-461 (1996) (discussing the contract theories
of anticipatory breach and novation or substitution of parties).
10 505 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (App. Div. 1986), affd, 510 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1987).
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raised by the association were used to pay for sporting and rec-
reational (i.e., non-essential) services and facilities.1 Neverthe-
less, all three courts found the defendants liable for the assess-
ments on the theory that an implied contract existed between the
recalcitrant home buyer and the association.12
III. MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL DOCTRINES INVOKED IN ASSESSMENT
COLLECTION LITIGATION
In addition to authority stemming from covenants running
with the land and the law of implied contracts, authority for levy-
ing and collecting assessments from property owners may be sup-
ported on an independent third ground, namely, the Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law" (and its predecessor, the Membership Corpora-
tion Law). Where the HOA operates under the aegis of the Not-for
Profit Corporation Law, it has all of the authority conferred by
that law.
While courts in the past focused almost exclusively upon the
terms of recorded covenants and restrictions (in sorting out the
relative rights of the HOA and its constituent owners), some have
placed emphasis on the rights, obligations, and procedures found
"' But see Shrub Oak Park Community Ass'n v. Fiducia, 410 N.Y.S.2d 666, 666
(App. Div. 1978) (holding that property owners, whose deeds did not contain the right
to use certain communal recreational facilities, did not have to pay association assess-
ments to maintain those facilities that were of a nonessential or recreational nature).
12 Although the assessment collection decisions rely on the theory of implied con-
tract (or contracts "implied in fact") between the property owner and the association in
upholding HOA assessments, occasionally references to "quasi contract" or "unjust en-
richment" make their way into the opinions. It is clear that the assessment collection
cases under discussion in this article, as a rule, do not draw fine theoretical distinc-
tions. They merely employ language of "contract implied in fact," "quasi contract,"
"unjust enrichment," and like terms to signify that the recalcitrant property owner
knew that the assessments were being levied to pay for community facilities and serv-
ices (at the time such owner decided to buy into the community), and would not be
heard to later argue that he was exempt from the obligation to pay the assessment on
some legal technicality. In essence, he is estopped from sidestepping the assessments
he knew were associated with owning the premises in question, and thereby unjustly
increasing his neighbor's aliquot share of the fnanci 4 burden. For discussions on the
general interplay of the doctrines of quasi-contract, restitution, and contract, see JOHN
D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §1.11 (4th ed. 1998);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.20 (3d ed. 1998); Joseph M. Perillo, Restitu-
tion in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1981). For an ex-
tensive discussion of the various contract, restitution and other theories for enforc-
ing HOA assessments that are otherwise questionable, see ROBERT G. NATELSON,
LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS § 6 (1989).
13 E.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. § 611(e) (McKinney 1997).
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in the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law. 4  Other courts have
abruptly terminated assessment litigation by ruling that no ultra
vires or similar defense could be invoked by the property owner
unless the latter had repaid the cost of the services previously
provided to the home owner by the association. 5 In other cases,
courts have found a waiver of the right to contest assessments
where the property owner had failed to seek review either by way
of an Article Seventy Eight proceeding or via a request for the Su-
preme Court to investigate the alleged malfunctioning of the
Board of the Membership or Not-for-Profit Corporation. 6 In some
instances, the courts have refused to set aside assessments on the
theory that to do so might permanently disrupt the functioning, if
not the very existence, of the HOA.'7 Still others have taken notice
of the increase in property values brought about by the facilities
and services furnished by the HOA,5 or simply have held that the
'4 See, e.g., Gillman v. Pebble Cove Home Owners Ass'n, 546 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App.
Div. 1989) (recognizing that the business judgment rule applied to the board's exercise
of its rulemaking authority); Roxrun Estates, Inc. v. Roxbury Run Village Ass'n, 526
N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1988) (applying New York's Not-For-Profit Corporation Law to
determine voting rights of board members).
15 See, e.g., Cirillo, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 563-64 (delineating the general rule that "one
who seeks to avoid liability on a contract on ultra vires grounds is liable upon an im-
plied contract to restore any benefits derived therefrom"); see also 14 N.Y. JUR. 2D,
Business Relationships §§ 425-431 (1996) (discussing the rules of Not-For-Profit corpo-
rations).
1' See, e.g., Goldens Bridge Community Ass'n v. Simon, N.Y. L.J. Dec. 23, 1968, at
16, (Dec. 22, 1968); Speisman, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (holding that even if the defendant
was a member of the association he lost his ability to contest his assessment because
he did not request court visitation as required by section 26 of the Membership Corpo-
rations Law); Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (finding the plaintiffs failure to request
the supreme court's assistance effectively foreclosed his ability to contest the assess-
ments).
17 See, e.g., Galvin, 324 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1974) (noting that HOAs are important to
the community and have standing to sue); Sea Gate Ass'n v. Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d
767, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (noting that an abatement of assessments would destroy the
existence of the private community); Board of Managers v. Gans, 340 N.Y.S.2d 826,
828 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (stating that if the court were to find that charges were levied im-
properly by the board, it would create chaos as to the administration of the condomin-
ium); see also United States v. Certain Lands, 49 F. Supp. 265, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1943)
(stating that where each owner bears a share of common costs, court must consider
increased financial burden remaining owners must shoulder if some lots are con-
demned); Caruso v. Board of Managers, 550 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (noting
that literal construction of the condominium act would not result in an invalidation of
the board's activities each time it failed to follow procedure).
18 See, e.g., Galvin, 324 N.E.2d at 321 (finding that HOAs were able to keep the
quality of the neighborhoods at a premium); Riverton Community Ass'n v. Myers, 530
N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (App. Div. 1988) (reasoning that a person's property may benefit by
HOA facilities even if that property is not adjacent to the facilities); Roxrun Estates,
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actions of directors or board members were immune from judicial
intervention because of the business judgment rule.'9
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN HOA ASSESSMENT LITIGATION
At first blush it would appear that the approach taken by
the New York courts in HOA assessment litigation is problemati-
cal, in that a property owner is being denied the opportunity to
challenge an assessment that may be irregular or invalid. The le-
gal cost or drawback to this approach, however, may be more ap-
Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (noting that property values increase, as do assessments,
when such property is improved with HOA facilities); Mohegan Colony Ass'n v. Picone,
402 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 1978) (remanding for determination of whether the defen-
dants benefited from the Association's expenditures).
19 See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317,
1321-22 (N.Y. 1990) (concluding that the appropriate standard of review for actions
of the cooperative board is analogous to the business judgment rule); Van Camp v.
Sherman, 517 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153-54 (App. Div. 1987) (stating that the business
judgment doctrine "bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in
good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful legitimate further-
ance of corporate purposes"); Breezy Point Coop., Inc. v. Young, 506 N.Y.S.2d 366,
367 (App. Div. 1986); Gans, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 828; see also Alvin I. Apfelberg, Trends
in Shareholder Suits Against Co-ops and Condos, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 31, 1990, at 1
(discussing the fiduciary responsibilities of board members that are associated with
the business judgment rule).
It should also be noted that in the most recent scholarly text on this subject,
Professor Robert G. Natelson analyzes various theories for allowing the HOA to
collect assessments and cites the New York approach with approval:
For the association, there were two advantages to the approach taken by
the Fleicher [sic] court. First, because recovery was in contract rather than
by mere lien foreclosure, it was possible to obtain a personal judgment
against the defendant property owners. Second, since recovery was in con-
tract rather than in restitution (Justice DiGiovanna having explicitly re-
jected a quasi-contract theory), the association could recover the full
amount of the assessments, and not just the amount by which the defen-
dants were enriched.
Justice DiGiovanna's contractual reasoning has now been generally ac-
cepted in New York, with resultant advantages for Property Owners Asso-
ciations. The DiGiovanna approach is applied whether the property owners
"knew of the benefit.., directly, by their deeds, or indirectly, by the na-
ture of the community. .. ." Some courts outside of New York may be re-
sponsive to this line of reasoning. The [original] Restatement of Property
seems to adopt it for some covenants, but not for assessment covenants
that may impose charges for more than a year.
NATELSON, supra note 12, § 6.1.2, at 221 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Tides Property
Owners' Ass'n v. Paolillo, 392 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (App. Div. 1977); see also JAN Z.
KRASNOWIECKI, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 319
(1964); Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Townhouses With Homes Associations: A New Perspec-
tive, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 717-20 (1975) (discussing covenants for maintenance
assessments and when such covenants will run with the land).
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parent than real. All other home owners (who are current in
meeting their assessments) are free to challenge the problematical
levy. 0 The fact that they do not may indicate that the vast bulk of
the remaining owners (if not all of them) regard the levy as neces-
sary, proper, or both. Again, the courts have traditionally looked
askance at the unjust enrichment that might occur if maverick
property owners were able to sidestep their financial obligations
on a technicality.
The landmark Tulk v. Moxhay21 case, which provided the
theoretical foundation for equitable servitudes, as well as the
Neponsite case, contain allusions to the unfair allocation of bur-
20 Thus, for example, an estoppel (or related defense based on quasi or implied
contract) did not prevent the New York Court of Appeals from reaching the sub-
stantive objections raised by the recalcitrant owner in Eagle Enterprises v. Gross,
349 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1976). It should be noted, however, that the Eagle Enterprises
decision was handed down by the court eleven years before it fully embraced the
position of the HOA in assessment cases. See Seaview Ass'n v. Williams, 510 N.E.2d
793 (N.Y. 1987). Moreover, the right to collect the annual assessment was being as-
serted by a developer (and not an HOA) in Eagle Enterprises. Despite these differ-
ences, the court of appeals could have dismissed the recalcitrant property owners'
defenses (and not reached the substantive law merits) if it chose to do so on the
theories adopted in all of the HOA assessment cases noted in this article.
For a more detailed analysis of the Eagle Enterprises opinion, see Patrick J. Ro-
ban, Preparing Community Associations for the Twenty-First Century: Anticipating
the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 3, 15 (1999).
2' 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). The Tulk v. Moxhay opinion states, in pertinent
part:
It is said that, the covenant being one which does not run with the land,
this Court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not whether the covenant
runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land
in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and
with notice of which he purchased. Of course, the price would be affected
by the covenant, and nothing could be more inequitable than that the
original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next day for a
greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from
the liability which he had himself undertaken.
That the question does not depend upon whether the covenant runs with
the land is evident from this, that if there was a mere agreement and no
covenant, this Court would enforce it against a party purchasing with no-
tice of it; for if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one
purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation
from the party from whom he purchased.
Id. at 1144.
Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d
793 (N.Y. 1938). The court wrote:
By that conveyance the grantee, however, obtained not only title to par-
ticular lots, but an easement or right of common enjoyment with other
property owners in roads, beaches, public parks or spaces and improve-
ments in the same tract. For full enjoyment in common by the defendant
1999]
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dens that would result if the covenants in question were found not
to be binding. Moreover, the approach followed by the New York
courts has the advantage of preserving the status quo and,
thereby, affording the community the opportunity to legitimate
the assessment through revision of the project's by-laws or other-
wise. Nor is the contrary approach, i.e., declaring the assessment
to be invalid in a particular case, free from difficulty. This ap-
proach causes economic uncertainty, undermines the day-to-day
operation of the HOA, and may affect the marketability or insur-
ability of the real property titles in question."
To the extent that such an approach would prevent the HOA
from updating its assessments (and thereby modernize its role in
the community), it would also be counterproductive.' Neverthe-
and other property owners of these easements or rights, the roads and
public places must be maintained. In order that the burden of maintaining
public improvements should rest upon the land benefited by the improve-
ments, the grantor exacted from the grantee of the land with its appurte-
nant easement or right of enjoyment a covenant that the burden of paying
the cost should be inseparably attached to the land which enjoys the bene-
fit. It is plain that any distinction or definition which would exclude such a
covenant from the classification of covenants which "touch" or "concern"
the land would be based on form and not on substance.
Id. at 797.
23 Illustrative of the disruption of the housing development's affairs that flows
from a technical approach that facilitates avoidance of one's obligation to pay the
assessment levied against one's property by the HOA, is Anderson v. Lake Arrow-
head Civic Ass'n, 483 S.E.2d 209, 213-14 (Va. 1997) (deciding that the association
could not assess sufficient fees because it did not qualify as a Property Owner's As-
sociation within the meaning of Property Owners' Association Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 55-508 to 55-516.2 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1997)). For in-depth analysis of the ju-
risprudential considerations that may be put forth in favor, or against, enforcing the
type of covenants and restrictions under discussion, see Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom
From Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA
L. REv. 615 (1985) and Timothy C. Shepard, Comment, Termination of Servitudes:
Expanding the Remedies for "Changed Conditions", 31 UCLA L. REV. 226 (1983).
24 Thus for example, the New York Court of Appeals has recognized an HOAs
standing in zoning matters, even though the association technically did not own any
land in the municipality in question. See Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 324
N.E.2d 317, 321 (N.Y. 1974). The court reasoned, in part, that such a ruling enables
the affected property owners to more effectively oppose the developer's onslaught,
by pooling their efforts and resources. See id. The New York Court of Appeals in
Douglaston felt that an appropriate representative association should have standing
to assert the rights of the individual members of the association where such persons
may be affected by a rezoning, variance or an exception determination of a zoning
board. See id. at 320. This author has commented:
The Court stated that the factors to be considered in assessing such appro-
priateness include: (1) the capacity of the organization to assume an adver-
sary position; (2) the size and composition of the organization as reflecting
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less, it must be recognized that the cases bailing out the HOA in
assessment litigation are at best a stop-gap measure and that the
long-term solution rests with modernization of the project's docu-
mentation, modernization of the applicable statutes, or both.'
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the legal right of
the Home Owner Association to collect assessments rests almost
entirely on the law of equitable servitude or covenants running
with the land. The condominium arrangement stands on a much
firmer footing because the authority of the Board of Managers is
generated by the state's condominium enabling legislation.
Similarly, the authority of the Board of Directors of a cooperative
housing venture rests on well established principles of corporate
law and landlord-tenant law. In marked contrast, the HOA
board must proceed without these supports and proceed in the
hostile environment created by strict construction principles that
a position fairly representative of the community or interests which it
seeks to protect; (3) the adverse effect of the zoning decision sought to be
reviewed on the group represented by the organization as within the scope
of interests sought to be protected; and (4) the openness of the organization
to full participating membership by all residents and property owners in
the relevant neighborhood.
1 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING & LAND USE CONTROLS § 2.03[4] [e] (1998). However,
forward looking decisions such as the Douglaston case would represent a Phyrric
victory if the authority of the HOA to levy assessments were forever governed by
outmoded covenants and restrictions. Perhaps the most difficult question to resolve
involves assessments made after the underlying covenants have expired by their
express terms. There is little authority on the question whether a simple majority of
the home owners involved may vote to extend the life of the covenants where the
latter do not expressly provide for such a vote on the issue of extension. This ques-
tion will become increasingly important in a related situation, i.e., where a coopera-
tive corporation's documents have reached the end of their specified original dura-
tion. At least one court has ruled that the proprietary lease may be extended by a
simple majority vote, making use of the provision governing modification of the
lease generally. See Sherry Assocs. v. Sherry-Netherland, Inc., N.Y. L.J., June 13,
1996, at 30 (Sup. Ct. June 12, 1996), affd, 657 N.Y.S.2d 549 (App. Div. 1997)
(mem.). It should be noted that, in connection with the Sherry Netherlands litiga-
tion, the New York State Attorney General's office issued a letter, ruling to the ef-
fect that no new offering plan need be filed with the State (nor distributed to the
stockholders) in connection with a vote to extend the project's proprietary lease.
25 The New York Court of Appeals has been quite liberal in its opinions in a re-
lated area, to wit, what promises made by a landlord in a commercial lease may be-
come binding upon a successor landlord (even though such promises may involve
acts to be performed on other, unrelated premises). See Bank of New York v.
Hirschfeld, 336 N.E.2d 710, 712 (N.Y. 1975).
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have been associated with affirmative covenants for centuries.
Nevertheless, there are certain changes that may be made in the
HOA project documents that may go a long way toward easing
the assessment collection process. Among these recommended
changes may be listed the following:
A. Legal Fees and Interest Provisions.
The HOA project's documentation should provide that an of-
fending property owner who defaults on his periodic assessments
(or otherwise contravenes his obligations as a constituent prop-
erty owner) will have to pay the reasonable legal fees of the HOA
in the event their dispute ends up in litigation. Such a provision
should be made applicable irrespective of whether the HOA ap-
pears in court as a plaintiff or defendant (provided, of course, the
HOA ultimately prevails in the suit). Moreover, the revised
documentation should make clear that unpaid assessments will
bear interest at the maximum rate permitted by law, from the
date it was originally due, if the assessment is not paid within a
specified period after it is levied. Such a provision should re-
move any doubt that might otherwise exist as to whether the
HOA is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the event of litiga-
tion. Wholly apart from the added authority these provisions
will give the HOA board, their very presence will speed up the
collection process and discourage litigation by constituent prop-
erty owners who are not on sound legal footing when they com-
mence a suit."
B. Creation of a Statutory Lien for HOA Assessments and a
Foreclosure Mechanism.
As matters currently stand, the HOA board seeking to en-
force assessments must bring an action to establish the basis for
the claimed lien and the amount thereof. This, of course, means
that the HOA must bring on a plenary suit whenever it under-
takes a collection effort. The collection mechanisms available to
the housing cooperative and to the condominium are far more
efficient and far less costly. The cooperatives' proprietary lease
or by-laws mandate that assessments or fines that remain unsat-
26 For illustrative project document provisions designed to spell out the steps for
an orderly assessment collection procedure, see NATELSON, supra note 12, at §§ 6.5-
6.6. Additional illustrations of assessment procedures in current use are spelled out
in the HOA project documents set forth in ROHAN, supra note 1, at app. C.
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isfied may form the basis for a summary proceeding, the object of
which is to cancel the proprietary lease of the offending stock-
holder.' The condominium remedies are equally efficient. New
York's condominium act contains statutory procedures to enable
the board of managers to collect overdue assessments. In the
event of non-payment, the statute gives the board of managers a
lien on each unit for unpaid common charges. The lien is given
priority over all other levies except:
(i) liens for taxes on the unit in favor of any assessing unit,
school district, special district, county or other taxing unit, and
(ii) all sums unpaid on a first mortgage of record or on a subor-
dinate mortgage of record held by the New York job develop-
ment authority or held by the New York state urban develop-
28
ment corporation.
Any member of the board of managers can perfect the lien by
filing a verified notice of the lien at the recording office where
the declaration is filed. The notice must state the name and ad-
dress of the property, the liber and page of the declaration, the
name of the record owner of the unit, the unit designation, the
amount and purpose of the charges, and the date when the
charges were due. If the common charges remain unpaid upon
the sale or conveyance of the unit, the statute mandates that
they be paid by the grantee from the proceeds of the sale or con-
veyance. The lien may be foreclosed in a suit authorized by and
brought in the name of the board of managers; or the board may
also bring suit for a money judgment, the commencement of
which does not waive the lien.29 Unfortunately, there is no com-
parable statutory lien in New York for a private community
managed by a home owner association (HOA) that is attempting
to collect overdue assessments from delinquent property own-
ers.
30
27 See 2A PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
COOPERATIVE HOUSING: LAW & PRACTICE §§ 8.01,9.05(5) (1998).
28 I
2 See id. at § 339-aa; see also, e.g., Board of Managers v. Shandel, 542 N.Y.S.2d
466 (Civ. Ct. 1989) (granting summary judgment for Board of Managers of a con-
dominium in suit to recover unpaid common charges from unit owner).
so The following excerpt summarizes the differences between a home owner as-
sociation property association and a condominium:
The homeowners' association differs from condominia ownership primarily
in the method of ownership of the common property. Unlike in the condo-
minium, in the homeowners' association the association itself has title to
this property. The individual homeowners are members of the association,
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A prototype for a statutory mechanism to enable the HOA to
more easily enforce its assessments is found in Virginia's
"Property Owners' Association Act,""' which provides in pertinent
part:
§ 55-516. Lien for assessments-A. Once perfected, the asso-
ciation shall have a lien on every lot for unpaid assessments
levied against that lot in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and all lawful provisions of the declaration. The lien,
once perfected, shall be prior to all other subsequent liens and
encumbrances except (i) real estate tax liens on that lot, (ii)
liens and encumbrances recorded prior to the recordation of the
declaration, and (iii) sums unpaid on and owing under any
mortgage or deed of trust recorded prior to the perfection of said
lien. The provisions of this subsection shall not affect the prior-
ity of mechanics' and materialmen's liens. Notice of a memo-
randum of lien to a holder of a credit line deed of trust under
§ 55-58.2 shall be given in the same fashion as if the associa-
tion's lien were a judgment.
B. The association, in order to perfect the lien given by
which is generally a nonstock, nonprofit corporation. In accordance with
the Declaration, the association is required to maintain, manage, and
regulate the common property and, in some cases, all or a portion of the
individually owned property. Another major difference is that in the home-
owners' association, the individual unit owners will have title only to their
own parcel of real estate and will not have an assigned percentage of own-
ership in the common property, as is the case with the condominium. Fi-
nally, unlike the condominium, the homeowners' association development
is not usually a creature of state-enabling legislation. As a result, some
substantive areas (e.g., assessments) use restrictions, and rule enforce-
ment can be less certain in their validity and effectiveness than with a
condominium.
WARREN N. FREEDMAN & JONATHAN B. ALTER, THE LAW OF CONDOMINIA AND
PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 23 (1992).
Housing cooperatives in New York may be formed under the Business Corpo-
ration Law or the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law. Some early housing cooperatives
were formed under the Cooperative Corporation Law, a statute traditionally associ-
ated with cooperatives engaged in marketing farm products. Unlike some other ju-
risdictions, the condominium arrangement in New York usually does not give rise to
a corporate entity (such as incorporation of the Board of Managers). See generally,
ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 27, §§ 6.01-6.04 (discussing common elements, duty of
association to maintain the common elements, expenses and assessment related to
such maintenance, and enforcement of payment of assessments); id. §§ 1.01-1.05,
9.04 (discussing structure and management of the cooperatives and cooperative
law).
31 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-509 to 55-516 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1997). For an appli-
cation of this statute, see Lake Monticello Owners'Ass'n v. Lake, 463 S.E.2d 652 (Va.
1995).
[73:199
ASSESSMENT LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
this section, shall file before the expiration of twelve
months from the time such assessment became due and
payable in the clerk's office in the county or city in which
such development is situated, a memorandum, verified by
the oath of the principal officer of the association, or such
other officer or officers as the declaration may specify,
which contains the following:
1. The name of the development;
2. A description of the lot;
3. The name or names of the persons constituting the
owners of that lot;
4. The amount of unpaid assessments currently due or
past due relative to such lot together with the date when
each fell due;
5. The date of issuance of the memorandum;
6. The name of the association and the name and current
address of the person to contact to arrange for payment or
release of the lien; and
7. A statement that the association is obtaining a lien in
accordance with the provisions of the Virginia Property
Owners' Association Act as set forth in Chapter 26 (§ 55-
508 et seq.) of Title 55.'
An argument could be made that, to the greatest extent
possible, the machinery for realizing upon a lien for unpaid
maintenance charges or special assessments should be the same
for a condominium, cooperative, or HOA project, to encourage
uniformity of treatment and to minimize the chance of confusion
on the part of the layman property owner. However, the format
of the condominium, cooperative, and HOA may differ in so
many ways that practitioners in these fields may prefer the
unique remedies already associated with each of them. Accord-
ingly, it may be argued that uniformity is not an essential ele-
ment of a sound assessment collection program. Moreover, the
requirement of the Martin Act33 that condominium, cooperative,
32Id. § 55-516. The balance of the section provides legal machinery for foreclos-
ing upon the lien, and makes provisions for interest costs and reasonable attorney
fees for the HOA. See id. The statute makes clear that the lien foreclosure proce-
dure does not supplant any other remedy the HOA might have, as, for example, a
suit to recover the debt. See id.
3N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1996). See generally VINCENT DI
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and HOA housing projects originate in an Offering Plan, and
pass muster in an Attorney General's Office review, may go a
long way towards ensuring that whatever collection procedures
are ultimately decided upon are reasonable and workable.
C. Revision of the By-Laws of the Not-for-Profit Corporation to
Allow for Two Classes of Membership
As originally enacted, the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law
allowed for only one class of stock. As a consequence, all stock-
holders would have the same rights and obligations. However, it
is sometimes essential to provide the flexibility of having differ-
ent types of stockholders with different rights and obligations
(including different rates of assessment). This is typically the
case at the inception of the project where the developer insists
upon specialized provisions that enable the builder to exercise
the vote attached to the unbuilt or unsold homes; and to pay only
a lesser or stepped-down assessment on such properties (as op-
posed to the full assessment payable by owner-occupied units).
In at least one case,' the developer surrendered valuable
property rights, in exchange for the extension of these two pre-
rogatives for a period beyond that specified in the original HOA
project documentation. This agreement was duly approved by
the HOA and memorialized in amended covenants and restric-
tions that were recorded in the land records. Unfortunately, the
parties failed to complete the paper work, in that they failed to
amend the Not-for-Profit Corporation's documents to create two
classes of stock-with one class to be held by the builder until
the project was completed and the other class to be held by the
constituent home buyers. When a dispute arose between the de-
veloper and the HOA, the former was found to have lost all of the
bargained-for prerogatives, because the corporate documents had
not been amended to create two classes of stock. This case
points out the necessity for attention to detail in managing the
affairs of the HOA and its constituent owners.35
LORENZO, NEW YORK CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE LAW §§ 2:8-2:13, 4:1, 4:2 (2d
ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the application of, and exemption from, the
Martin Act in real estate syndication and other securities offerings).
See Roxrun Estates, Inc. v. Roxbury Run Village Ass'n, Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d 633
(App. Div. 1988).
The Appellate Division's decision in Roxrun appears to be overly formalistic in
its approach and may result in an unwarranted forfeiture of the developer's assets.
The constituent owners had worked out a mutually acceptable settlement and me-
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morialized the same by amending the project's previously recorded covenants and
restrictions. Should the developer be deprived of his interest in the project merely
because the parties neglected to amend the Not-for-Profit Corporation's by-laws to
make allowance for two classes of stock, each with different rights and obligations?
Would it not have produced a more equitable solution to regard as done what the
parties agreed to do (and thought they had already done), by ordering the HOA and
its constituent members to amend the Bylaws as they had agreed in principle?
Compare the forward looking approach of the Supreme Court in United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), wherein the Court found that the em-
ployment of stock as a vehicle in housing cooperatives was merely incidental to the
overall picture, and, therefore no registration of such stock with the SEC was re-
quired.
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